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Abstract 
Kant claimed that human beings have no duties to animals because they are not 
autonomous ends in themselves. I argue that Kant was wrong to exclude animals 
from the realm of moral consideration. Animals, although they do not set their own 
ends and thus cannot be regarded as ends in themselves, do have ends that are
given to them by nature. As beings with ends, they stand between mere things that
have no ends, and rational beings that are ends in themselves. I propose a broader 
version of Kant's kingdom of ends, in which rational beings respect the ends of all
other beings that have them, including animals. The moral status of animals would 
still be dependent on the existence of rational beings, but our duty to take their 
ends into account would be a direct duty to them, rather than being a covert duty to
human beings. 
Introduction 
Immanuel Kant holds that we have no duties to animals, because
they are not ends in themselves, that is, autonomous beings of 
intrinsic value.  Instead, we have indirect duties with regard to them. 
We ought not treat them cruelly, as it damages our natural 
sympathies and thus can harden us in our dealings with other human 
beings. He uses the example of a man who has his dog shot when the 
animal is no longer of service; this is not a violation of any duty to the
dog, but of his duty to cultivate “the kindly and humane qualities in 
himself, which he ought to exercise in virtue of his duties to 
mankind” (Kant 1997b 27:459). Thus our duties with regard to 
animals are actually duties to human beings.  We may kill animals if 
it is done humanely, and put them to work if it does not strain their 
capacities; in other words, we can use them as means to our ends, but
we must avoid being cruel as we do it (Kant 1996b 6:443, 1997b 
27:458-460). 
The indirect-duty theory is usually considered unacceptable by 
those seeking a robust account of human obligations to animals, for 
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various reasons. (I have previously discussed some of the reasons in 
more detail; see Fieldhouse [2004].)  I will argue that animals can be
given a higher moral standing while leaving most of Kant's ethical 
framework intact. 
Korsgaard's Kantian Direct-Duty Theory 
The obvious approach to forming a Kantian theory of direct 
duties to animals would be to claim that Kant should instead have 
recognized animals as ends in themselves.  This is essentially the
route taken by Tom Regan in his broadly Kantian approach to animal 
ethics, but insofar as he was successful it was by reconstructing the 
end in itself into a new concept of moral personhood that he calls 
"subject-of-a-life" (2004). Whatever the merits of this position, it 
makes no claim of being a truly Kantian position.  The concept of the 
end in itself is one of the pillars of Kant's ethics, and it cannot be 
altered or replaced without substantial revision of other aspects of 
Kantian doctrine. 
On the other hand, Christine Korsgaard claims that "end in 
itself" as described by Kant can be understood to include animals. 
She argues that the aspect of ourselves that we value, when we regard
ourselves as ends in ourselves, is not only our rational nature, but 
also our animal nature. What differentiates the good for an animal 
from the good for an object such as a car, is that an animal has a 
natural good that matters to it, just as a human-qua-animal has a 
natural good that also matters to him or her. Korsgaard holds that a 
good "matters" to a being when that being "welcomes, desires, enjoys,
and pursues its good" (Korsgaard 2005, 103).  As legislating moral 
agents, we legislate for that natural good by promoting things that 
preserve our bodily lives, and forbidding things that harm, terrify, or 
destroy us; thus as moral arbiters of the universe we have declared 
our animal nature to be valuable (104).  “Animal nature is an end-in-
itself, because our own legislation makes it so” (106). 
Although I am in agreement with the general theme of 
Korsgaard's interpretation, I believe she has erred in elevating 
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animals to the status of ends in themselves.  Being an end in itself has
two facets, which are closely related.  The first is that an end in itself 
is never a mere means, and cannot be used as a tool to achieve other
ends (Kant 1996b, 4:428); this is sense of “end in itself” addressed by
Korsgaard's argument. (All references to Kant are to the Akademie 
marginal pagination.)  The second is that an end in itself is itself a 
source of ends, an autonomous legislator (Kant 1996b, 4:435).  These 
are not independent ways of being an end in itself; the first is 
dependent on the second, as it is our status as moral legislators that 
makes it impossible for us to be merely a means and so forbids others
from treating us as such: "morality is the condition under which 
alone a rational being can be an end in itself, since only through this 
is it possible to be a lawgiving member in the kingdom of ends.  
Hence morality, and humanity insofar as it is capable of morality, is
that which alone has dignity" (Kant 1996b, 4:435). The law 
determines the worth of various things, relative to each other, but the 
lawgiving itself has infinite worth; thus it is our moral dimension that
makes us ends in ourselves (Kant 1996b, 4:435-436; cf. 4:437-438).  
Kant regards autonomous legislation as both necessary and sufficient 
for a being to have a dignity rather than a price, that is, to be an end 
in itself rather than a means. Kant's intention is not to show that 
autonomy is one possible criterion, but that it is the only possible 
criterion; this is evidenced when Kant claims that ". . .morality is the 
condition under which alone a rational being can be an end in itself . .
." and that ". . . humanity insofar as it is capable of morality is that 
which alone has dignity. . ." (Kant 1996b, 4:435). Everything else can
be used merely as a means (Kant 1996a, 5:87). 
Korsgaard's claim that animals are ends in themselves does not,
therefore, sit well with Kant's theory.  If we confine ourselves to just 
the first sense of "end in itself" (something that is not a mere means) 
then we might include animals in it, but we would need a whole new 
explanation of what justifies declaring anything, human or animal, an
end in itself. The fact that we both have a natural good that matters 
to us is not enough to show that this forbids our use as means.  More 
work would need to be done there and, like Regan's view, it would 
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entail a wide divergence from Kant.  Kant has an internally coherent 
justification for granting humans this status, but it is one that cannot 
be extended to animals. In the interest of showing that Kant can 
accommodate a more robust theory of duties to animals while doing 
as little violence to the rest of his ethical theory as possible, I must 
reject Korsgaard's claim that animals are ends in themselves. 
Like Korsgaard, I will argue that the assignment of value by 
rational beings is what gives rise to our obligation to take nonrational
beings into account in our moral legislation.  My starting place will 
not, however, be our shared animality.  I find two weaknesses in that 
approach. First, as Korsgaard herself acknowledges (Korsgaard 
2005, 100n), when Kant discusses our duties to ourselves with 
respect to our animal nature, all the examples ultimately demonstrate
that abusing our animal nature is bad because in doing so we also
abuse our rational nature. Thus Kant is showing that it is our rational
nature, not our animal nature, that exists as an end in itself.   
Korsgaard is willing to diverge from Kant on this point.  I would be, 
too, but her argument has not provided a compelling reason to do so. 
Second, Korsgaard has not successfully shown that in legislating for 
the protection of our animal needs, that it is the animality we are 
valuing. Instead, one could argue that what is being valued is the 
autonomy of rational beings, first by preserving our lives (a necessary
precondition for preserving our autonomy), and second by protecting 
our right to pursue private ends related to our animal nature, as long 
as they do not interfere with others' right to do the same. 
Animals as Subjects in the Kingdom of Ends 
In rejecting the claim that animals are ends in themselves, it may 
seem that I have eliminated any possibility of anything more than 
indirect duties with respect to animals.  The end in itself is the center 
of Kant's ethics and the source of all value.  How can there be any 
room left for animals? I believe that the answer lies in Kant's idea of 
the Kingdom of Ends. 
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Kant offers three main formulations of the categorical 
imperative. The first uses the criterion of universalizability, and the 
second commands that we treat humanity as an end in itself.  The
third introduces the idea of a Kingdom of Ends, which Kant describes
as "a whole of all ends in systematic connection (a whole both of 
rational beings as ends in themselves and of the ends of his own that 
each may set himself)" (Kant 1996b, 4:433).  In other words, it is the 
idea of a world in which all the ends of rational beings are respected 
and none are in conflict.  In such a world, all rational beings are both 
legislators and subjects of the law.  We should judge our own actions 
by whether they would accord with this harmonious kingdom of 
ends. Kant formulates this as "act in accordance with the maxims of 
a member giving universal laws for a merely possible kingdom of 
ends" (Kant 1996b, 4:439). 
Although it is not entirely clear that the three formulations of the
categorical imperative are equivalent as Kant claims, they are 
certainly interrelated. The formula of universalizability uses the form
of the law as a measuring stick and the formula of humanity uses the 
matter of the law. The Kingdom of Ends synthesizes the two into one 
concept in which form and matter unite, resulting in a world of
universal laws that respect and protect the ends of all rational beings. 
It is not hard to see why the Kingdom of Ends has appealed to many
recent commentators. Its incorporation of the previous two 
formulations makes it the richest conception of the categorical 
imperative that Kant offers.  Although Kant assures us that all the 
formulations express a single categorical imperative, the formula of 
the Kingdom of Ends makes it easier to see how the formula of 
universal law and the formula of humanity work together. 
Kant identifies two roles for persons in the Kingdom of Ends.  
Every rational being is either a member or a sovereign.  Members 
both legislate, and are subject to universal laws; this is the category 
that we as human beings fall into. A sovereign, on the other hand, 
would be a rational being who legislates without being subjected to 
anyone else's will; this is possible "only in case he is a completely 
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independent being, without needs and with unlimited resources 
adequate to his will" (Kant 1996b, 4:434).  God would presumably be 
such a being; elsewhere Kant explains that the concept of duty does 
not apply to a holy will, a claim that he also makes for the sovereign 
of the Kingdom of Ends (Kant 1996b, 4:434). Everything that is not a
member or a sovereign is merely a thing, to be used as a means for 
rational beings to achieve their ends. 
The Groundwork implies that animals have no place in the 
Kingdom of Ends apart from their usefulness to rational beings.  
Beings without reason "have only a relative worth, as means, and are
therefore called things" (Kant 1996b, 4:428). Animals, then, must be 
things. (This would hold even if Kant were to acknowledge that some 
animals have degrees of rationality, because the rational capacity that 
concerns Kant in these passages is the ability to act according to 
principle, a capacity which even the most intelligent animals lack.)  
Kant sharply divides the Kingdom of Ends into persons and things; 
the former have dignity, the latter merely a price.  Because animals 
cannot participate in the Kingdom as legislators, they are not 
members and their ends are not taken into account in the systematic 
unity. 
Kant's political analogy lacks an obvious group that can exist in a
natural kingdom – that of the subject, who is governed (and, ideally, 
protected) by laws but cannot legislate them.  Kant may have seen 
this role as being filled by things, but I believe that subjects are 
distinct from things. Subjects are beings whose interests are taken 
into account by the laws that members and sovereigns enact, even 
though they do not participate in legislating those laws; in a worldly 
government, this would typically include children, the severely 
mentally impaired, and so on. (It also often includes resident aliens, 
but that category does not carry over into the Kingdom of Ends, 
which has no such territorial boundaries.)  Laws can be enforced on 
their behalf. This is the legal equivalent of moral patienthood.  
Things, on the other hand, have no interests of their own (although 
we may have an interest in them) so it would not make sense to 
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legislate on their behalf.  Extending the political metaphor that Kant 
uses in discussing the Kingdom of Ends, I will use the term "subject" 
to describe those who would have the status of moral patients in the 
Kingdom of Ends. 
Kant does not acknowledge the existence of subjects in the 
Kingdom of Ends.  He does, however, make reference to the idea of a 
subject when discussing why human beings must be subject only to 
laws that we give ourselves.  Human beings are autonomous, and 
thus in the Kingdom of Ends cannot be mere subjects.  If we were 
subject to the law without being its originators, then the law must 
compel us by some external means, that is, heteronomously (Kant 
1996b, 4:433). Thus the law must be one that we give ourselves.  
Being both subject to and legislator of the law is what gives us the 
status of member in the Kingdom of Ends. 
Animals cannot be moral legislators because they are incapable 
of acting according to self-originated principles; thus they cannot be 
members in the Kingdom of Ends. They also are not subject to the 
law. We no longer put animals on trial or execute them for crimes; 
we may kill a dog that has injured people, but we do so for reasons of 
safety, not justice. We consider it appropriate to constrain an 
animal's behavior according to relevant laws, but it is the animal's 
guardian that is truly subject to the law.  A dog does not understand 
that it is not permitted to foul the sidewalk, but we still have laws 
against that behavior and we expect the dog's guardian to compel it to
act in a certain way. This can be carried over by analogy into the 
ideal Kingdom of Ends. Since animals are not internally motivated to
follow the law by reason, they may be externally compelled in certain 
ways by the members of the Kingdom.  The law would be addressed 
to the moral agents responsible for them, not to the animals 
themselves. In a way animals are subject to the law, in that we can 
legislate certain restraints on their behavior.  But this is not really the 
same sense in which a moral agent is subject to the law, because the 
agent can understand the law and act accordingly.  An animal can be 
compelled physically or psychologically to act a certain way, but will 
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usually be responding to something unrelated to the law.  The agent, 
on the other hand, can be motivated by the law itself.  Animals are a 
subject of the law, rather than being subject to the law. 
In some cases, animals may be capable of understanding a law.  
Kanzi the bonobo and Alex the African gray parrot are famous cases 
of animals that have been taught to use language.  This implies a 
capacity for conceptual thought.  Some animals also engage in 
deceptive behavior, which could suggest the capacity to attribute 
beliefs and intentions to others (though this is controversial, as the 
behavior may be explicable without the animals having such a theory
of mind). Animals that have such advanced reasoning capacities 
might be able to recognize and understand laws.  This would likely 
apply only to a small number of animals as special cases.  Even those 
animals that do understand a law would still not be lawgivers in the
kingdom of ends, as they would not be capable of generating laws 
according to rational principles. This gray area points to the fact that 
rationality is not the all-or-nothing state that Kant regarded it to be. 
Animals, I argue, should be regarded as subjects in the Kingdom 
of Ends, and we must legislate on behalf of them and in their best 
interests. In order to make this argument, I will need to establish two
main claims. First, that animals have interests in a way that things 
do not; and second, that those interests should be considered by the 
legislators of the Kingdom of Ends. 
How Animals Have Interests 
A being with interests, as I use the term, is one that has ends that
matter to it. Having ends is a quality that animals share with human 
beings (and by extension other rational beings), and that they do not 
share with anything else.  This is because having ends implies a 
power of choice.  Things like tables and cars have ends only 
metaphorically or by extrapolation of the human ends involved with 
them. Plants are a harder case, as they seem to have ends that lead 
them to grow toward a light source and other basic movements.  But 
Kant does not attribute a power of choice to plants (whereas he does 
  
 
 
 
33
attribute a power of choice to animals [Kant 1997a, A 534/B 562]), 
and I see no reason to disagree.  The power of choice is a mental 
faculty, and it is implausible to attribute mind to plants as we do to 
animals. 
It is possible that one could argue that plants possess a low-level 
calculating function that governs their heliotropic behavior, and that 
is different only in degree from the basic weighing of inclinations that
is involved in the animal power of choice.  Or, one could argue that it 
is possible to build a machine that mimics the animal power of choice
in its ability to select between options in the pursuit of goals (which 
we would then perhaps be justified in calling "ends").  If machines 
and plants also have ends, then the apparently special status of 
animals and the importance of ends is diminished. 
Even if I did acknowledge such similarities between animals, 
plants, and machines, animals' ends would still be of a different kind, 
because their ends matter to them – that is, it matters to them 
whether those ends are achieved or frustrated.  An animal is, as 
Korsgaard puts it, "an organic system to whom its own good 
matters" (Korsgaard 2005, 103). Things can go well or badly for it in 
a way that things cannot go well or badly for a table or a car, or even a
tree. 
Of course, there is a sense in which things are "good for" a table 
or car.  It is good for a wooden table to be oiled periodically, and bad 
for it to be sat upon by a heavy person; it is good for a car to have 
proper oil pressure, and bad for it to be exposed to a lot of salt. In a 
biological sense, various things are good or bad for trees. But these 
things do not capture what I mean for something to "go well or badly"
for a being. 
Kant's argument for indirect duties to animals itself rests on an 
intuition that animals' ends matter to them.  Why is it that he 
identifies mistreatment of animals as something that damages our 
humanity, but not mistreatment of carriages or tables?  (Likewise for 
plants; although he does argue that it is a duty to avoid wanton 
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destruction of natural beauty, his reasons for this are separate from 
his reasons for avoiding cruelty to animals, and he regards the latter 
as "far more intimately opposed" to our duty [Kant 1996c, 6:443].)  
Kicking the wheels of a carriage or taking a hatchet to a table might 
be foolish, but it does not damage our humanity as would kicking a 
horse's legs or taking a hatchet to a dog.  Why not?  It cannot be just 
that the objects do not resemble human beings enough, because on 
the surface an animatronic pirate at Disneyland resembles a human 
being a lot more than a dog does, yet no one would suggest we have 
duties with respect to animatronics. 
The answer lies in Kant's own remark about why we have duties 
with respect to animals: because cruelty "dulls his shared feeling of 
their suffering" (Kant 1996c, 6:443).  Tables and animatronics do not 
suffer; that is, they do not experience suffering. There is no feeling 
there for us to share. But when one kicks a dog, the dog suffers; 
kicking it is not just bad for it, it is bad for it in a way that matters to 
it, because it is conscious.  The belief that animals are conscious is
implicitly acknowledged by Kant in his theory of indirect duties.  
Because they are conscious, animals have ends that matter to them, a 
characteristic they share with human beings but that sets them apart 
from things; I term this "having interests." 
The Value of Happiness 
Showing that animals have interests at least gives a possible 
criterion that allows them to be separated from mere things in the 
Kingdom of Ends. However, it is not sufficient to establish that these 
interests must be taken into account by the members of the 
Kingdom. I will argue for this further claim by discussing the value of 
happiness. 
In the Critique of Practical Reason, Kant defines "happiness" as 
"the state of a rational being in the world in the whole of whose 
existence everything goes according to his wish and will" (Kant 
1996a, 5:124). By limiting this to rational beings, he seems to exclude
the possibility that animals can be happy at all. 
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Why would rationality be required for happiness?  The apparent 
limitation might simply be due to context, since he is discussing
rational beings in the passage. Or it could be that somehow 
happiness is dependent on the possession of a will (Wille). It is true 
that animals do not have a will (Wille) as this is limited to fully 
rational beings; however, animals do have a power of choice 
(Willkür). Insofar as an animal is able to obtain the objects of its 
power of choice (which might be described as having things "go 
according to its wishes"), this would seem to fit Kant's definition of 
happiness. Happiness for a human being would be different from 
happiness for an animal, since the former would involve the rational 
will and the latter a merely animal power of choice, but both could 
fall under the general term "happiness." 
Perhaps it is not the fulfillment of every individual desire that 
constitutes happiness, but the satisfaction of knowing that all one's 
desires have been fulfilled; this would require a higher-order ability 
of reflection than most, if any, animals possess.  It would seem to 
require reason, although not necessarily the moral component of 
reason. It is moral reasoning that animals conspicuously lack, 
whereas some other aspects of reason are apparently present.  So it is 
possible that some of the most intelligent animals have the ability to
conceptualize that their desires have been satisfied.  Still, the 
requirement that a creature be able to reflect on its own satisfaction 
would exclude almost all, if not all, animals from being capable of 
happiness. 
The more general definitions of happiness that Kant gives in the 
Groundwork – "that complete well-being and satisfaction with one's 
condition" – (Kant 1996b, 4:393), and "the entire satisfaction of 
[needs and inclinations]" (4:405) – do not make reference to 
rationality as a requirement for happiness, although they do not rule 
out that claim either. If Kant does incorporate a requirement for 
rational reflection into his concept of happiness at times, he does not 
do so consistently: when discussing the use of practical reason to 
further one's happiness, Kant states that a person's reason ". . . does
  
 
 
 
36
not at all raise him in worth above mere animality if reason is to serve
him only for the sake of what instinct accomplishes for animals. . 
." (Kant 1996a, 5:51-62).  Given the context, it is plausible to take 
"what instinct accomplishes in animals" to be the attainment of 
happiness. 
The solution, I believe, is in the following passage: 
. . . as far as our nature as sensible beings is concerned, all
that counts is our happiness if this is appraised, as reason
especially requires, not in terms of transitory feeling but 
of the influence this contingency has on our whole 
existence and our satisfaction with it. . . (Kant 1996a, 
5:61). 
Two important points can be gleaned from this passage.  First, that 
Kant acknowledged a broader definition of happiness under which it 
is possible to evaluate it in terms of transitory feeling (which animals 
certainly possess). Second, that rational beings always evaluate their 
own happiness by seeing how the satisfaction of particular desires fits
into their well being as a whole.  I take this to mean that for beings 
that are capable of reflecting on the fact that their needs have been 
met, this reflection is part of their happiness, but that this ability to 
reflect is not required for beings that do not reflect in this way.  This 
would explain why it is more difficult for humans to be happy than 
for animals; our happiness has an additional requirement that 
animals' does not. 
According to Kant, happiness is not in itself good, but only in 
combination with a good will, which "seems to constitute the 
indispensable condition even of worthiness to be happy" (Kant 
1996b, 4:393). Kant thus defines virtue as worthiness to be happy, 
and states that the highest good of a possible world is for happiness
to be distributed in proportion to virtue (Kant 1996a, 5:110).  This is 
similar to the idea of the Kingdom of Ends, with the addition that we 
must postulate God in order to ensure that happiness actually is 
distributed in proportion to virtue, since that does not necessarily 
happen in nature. 
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Since happiness in proportion to virtue is the highest good, we 
must make the happiness of others our end.  This would apparently 
not include animals, because animals, as they are not moral agents, 
lack virtue. They cannot, therefore, be worthy to be happy, as Kant 
has described it.  On the other hand, they are not deserving of 
unhappiness, either.  Their happiness is simply irrelevant, except 
insofar as our indirect duties require us to preserve it for our own 
ends. 
Kant argues that happiness is not good in itself because, without 
the influence of a good will, it can give rise to boldness and arrogance 
(Kant 1996b, 4:393), and because we dislike seeing immoral people 
enjoying happiness, and only approve of it when it is had by virtuous 
people (4:393). Thus only when paired with the one thing that is 
good in itself – a good will, which animals cannot have – does it have 
value. 
Kant's argument suffers from a flaw: if happiness cannot be 
judged on its own merits, apart from the presence of a good will, then
why is it that we take pleasure in the happiness of a virtuous person, 
but displeasure in the happiness of an evil person?  We base this
evaluation on the belief that a good person deserves happiness, and a 
bad person does not.  How do we know what a good person 
deserves? The concept of desert involves some sort of equivalence 
between the character of the agent and the quality of the thing that is 
deserved. Good people deserve good things.  So in order to declare 
that good people deserve happiness, we must already have judged 
happiness to be a good (not necessarily the highest good, but a good 
nonetheless).  There must be some sense in which happiness is a
good independent of the presence of a good will. 
If happiness is a good, then why is it that in some situations, 
such as those Kant mentions, we do not judge it to be good?  Doesn't 
the fact that we dislike seeing evil people happy suggest that it 
achieves its goodness only when combined with virtue?  I admit that 
there is a relationship between virtue and worthiness to be happy, but
it is complex. If our intuitions reveal that there is something wrong 
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with virtuous people being unhappy or evil people being happy, they 
also reveal further wrinkles. A small child happy at play is a sight 
that meets with almost universal approval; conversely, nothing is 
more upsetting than the sight of a child in distress.  Yet a child, prior 
to the age of reason, is incapable of morality.  Our judgment that 
children should be happy is not based on the child's moral character. 
Whenever children are raised as an example in moral 
philosophy, the first inclination is to treat them akin to moral agents 
because of their potential to become moral agents. One could argue 
that children have the potential to become virtuous, and thus are 
worthy to be happy. Potentiality, however, does not solve the current 
problem. Children have the same potential to become evil as to
become good. This would seem to imply either that the two cancel 
either other out, and children should be neither happy nor unhappy, 
or else that both are entailed, and the child should be made both 
happy and unhappy (perhaps alternately).  We have no justification 
to assume that a child is going to become good (nor, of course, that it 
is going to become evil). 
What is behind our intuitions about the happiness of  children? 
Why is the happiness of a child so cherished, and the misery of a child
so disdained? The answer, I believe, lies in the concept of innocence. 
As pre-moral beings, young children can do no evil.  It is the lack of 
evil that we regard as the prerequisite for happiness, not the presence
of moral goodness.  In a rational adult, the lack of evil entails the 
presence of moral goodness; in a nonrational or pre-rational being, 
neither is present. 
This also applies to our evaluation of happiness in animals.  We
take pleasure in animals' happiness, just as we have a shared sense of 
their suffering. The sight of happy animals at play does not produce 
as strong a reaction as the sight of happy children (no doubt for 
natural reasons related to the propagation of the species), but we do 
approve of it. We have a sense that animals are innocent, that they 
do nothing (morally) wrong, and although we may resent their 
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presence at times, when we are thoughtful and objective we do not 
blame them when their actions have a negative impact on us. 
I believe that it is not virtue that makes one worthy of happiness, 
but the lack of vice. Rather than the presence of virtue making 
happiness good, it is the presence of evil that ruins it, robbing it of its 
prima facie goodness. But what grounds this goodness?  As moral 
agents, we necessarily confer value upon it.  Kant states that 
happiness is the ". . . one end that can be presupposed as actual in the 
case of all rational beings. . . and therefore one purpose that they not 
merely could have but that we can safely presuppose that they all 
actually do have by a natural necessity" (Kant 1996b 4:415; cf. Kant 
1996a, 5:25). As finite, rational beings – i.e. human beings – we 
necessarily regard happiness as valuable.  Although it is our own 
happiness that nature instructs us to cherish, as rational beings and 
members of the Kingdom of Ends, our adoption of happiness as an 
end confers value upon it and thus we legislate for its general 
promotion. Korsgaard points out that Kant is not a value realist.  
That is, he does not believe there are intrinsically valuable things or 
qualities, which we then discover and arrange our morality around.  
Instead, as moral legislators we are the source of value (Korsgaard 
18). 
Since happiness is a natural end of all finite, rational beings, it 
has a value that we confer upon it.  We see it as a prima facie good, 
and so we seek to promote it wherever it appears, except when it is 
tainted by evil. It is not, for the reasons Kant shows, absolutely good, 
and it is not the source of value; rather, rationality is the source of 
value, but as rational beings we place a value on happiness. 
But when we take happiness as a value, why do we make an
exception for immoral persons? All human beings have their own 
happiness as an end.  As rational beings, we are supposed to evaluate 
all our actions as though we were legislators in the Kingdom of Ends, 
in which everyone's ends are in harmony.  Thus, our own actions 
must promote, and not interfere with, the happiness of others. When
rational beings interfere with others' ends, they are trying to make an 
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exception of themselves.  They will that their own ends should be met
while others' are frustrated, but no consistent law can be made from 
this in the Kingdom of Ends.  Thus in the real world, when we see 
such people being happy, we recognize the inconsistency between 
their willing unhappiness for others but receiving happiness for 
themselves, and this offends our rationality.  In the case of children 
and animals (as well as those with a good will), happiness entails no 
inconsistency in will, and thus the value we confer upon it is not 
forfeited. 
This argument does not contradict Kant's claim that the only 
thing good in itself is a good will.  I have argued that happiness can be
evaluated as a prima facie good independent of whether it is attached 
to a good will, but its value still comes ultimately from its 
endorsement by the human will, and so its good is still derivative 
rather than inherent. 
Kant's own remarks about the good will fit well with my claim 
about the prima facie value of happiness: 
Understanding, wit, judgment and the like. . . are 
undoubtedly good and desirable for many purposes, but 
they can also be extremely evil and harmful if the will 
which is to make use of these gifts of nature. . . is not 
good. It is the same with gifts of fortune. Power, riches, 
honor, even health and that complete well-being and 
satisfaction with one's condition called happiness, 
produce boldness and thereby often arrogance as well 
unless a good will is present which corrects the influence 
of these on the mind. . . (Kant 1996b, 4:393) 
Note that Kant claims that it is the presence of an evil will that 
renders some talents of mind and qualities of temperament harmful, 
and then remarks that the same is true of happiness.  Furthermore, 
he says that the reason a good will must be present in conjunction 
with happiness is that it will correct its influence on the mind.  In an 
animal, no evil will can be present, and thus no correction is 
required. Kant's remarks in this passage support my claim that it is
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the absence of an evil will, rather than the presence of a good will, 
that is the important factor in judging worthiness to be happy. 
Human beings can, and in fact must, have ends other than their 
own happiness. Animals, as nonmoral, are always concerned 
ultimately with satisfying their own needs, and thus with happiness.  
Taking account of animals' interests in the Kingdom of Ends would 
mean providing for their happiness.  Since we have acknowledged
happiness as valuable provided it is not accompanied by an evil will, 
we should legislate on behalf of animals in the Kingdom of Ends. 
Their status would be that of subjects, protected by the laws but not 
participating in their creation.  This expanded view of the Kingdom of
Ends allows us to see where Kant should have placed moral patients 
such as animals. 
How this Theory Differs from Kant's Indirect-Duty
Theory 
It might be objected that what I have proposed is simply an 
indirect duty view under another guise, and thus that it is subject to 
all the same problems that many commentators have identified with 
that view. Since animals are not ends in themselves, it would seem
that their ends, insofar as we are obliged to take them into account, 
are really ends for us.  The duties that we have to promote their ends 
are not, however, merely covert duties to human beings.  We must 
promote animals' happiness because happiness is valuable; and it is 
the happiness of that animal that we are obliged to promote, not 
some indirect effect on the happiness of human beings.  Therefore, 
my view is not an indirect duty view as Kant's is.  Animals, however, 
do have a status that is contingent on our own, and so our duties to 
them are not duties to them in quite the same way that our duties to 
human beings are.  This is because it is not the animals that bind us 
in a relation of obligation; the source of the obligation is ourselves as 
rational beings. Our duties to other rational beings, on the other 
hand, are duties that originate in them as well as in ourselves. 
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Since animals' moral status is dependent on the value that 
rational beings place on happiness, it might seem that our duties to 
animals are really only covert duties to ourselves, to respect our own 
values. (Note that this criticism would apply equally to Korsgaard, 
since she makes animals' status as ends in themselves dependent on 
the value that rational beings place on their animal nature.)  I object 
to Kant's indirect duty view for several reasons, one of which is that 
animals' moral status is entirely dependent on human psychology, 
and so if it turned out that we could learn to separate our sympathy 
for animals from our sympathy for rational beings, there would be 
nothing wrong with torturing animals.  My own view may seem to be 
equally contingent and open to a similar objection.  We must provide 
for animals' happiness because we happen to value happiness in 
ourselves; thus, if we did not value happiness, we could harm animals
as we wished. 
Although it is true that my view maintains Kant's claim that only 
rational beings are ends in themselves, and thus the moral status of 
other beings is dependent on ours, it is not contingent in the same
way Kant's is. Kant claims that happiness is "necessarily the demand 
of every rational but finite being" (Kant 1996a, 5:25).  Although it is 
contingent in the sense that what constitutes happiness varies from 
person to person (and presumably would vary even more if we knew 
of any other rational but finite beings), it is subjectively necessary in 
the sense that as finite beings we have needs and these needs are 
necessarily incorporated into our desires (Kant 1996a, 5:25).  Those 
desires, and the happiness that results from fulfilling them, are an 
inextricable part of our humanity. Happiness is bound up with our 
being not just rational beings, but also human beings. Furthermore, 
happiness is such an important value for us as finite rational beings, 
that its presence (in proportion to virtue) is necessary for the 
attainment of the supreme good. Linking animals' status to the value 
we place on happiness does not put them in the precarious position 
that linking their status to the promotion of sympathy does.  My own 
position does not make the wrongness of cruel treatment of animals 
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dependent on any effect that the treatment would have on the agent 
or on other human beings. 
Conclusion 
My intention has been to carve out a space for animals in Kant's 
moral theory by discarding his unsatisfactory account of indirect 
duties and replacing it with a theory that provides for a more robust 
conception of animals' place in the moral sphere.  Although I have 
focused on animals, I believe that my conclusions will also help 
account for permanently nonrational human beings, such as those 
with severe developmental disabilities and those suffering from 
advanced Alzheimer's disease. In striving toward the Kingdom of 
Ends, we should take into account all beings with ends that matter to 
them. Although it may be equally consistent with the rest of his 
moral theory to simply deny that there is anything wrong with 
treating animals as cruelly as we wish, I believe that this violates 
Kant's attempt to create a moral system that accords with common 
intuition. In proposing the doctrine of indirect duties to animals, 
Kant seems to be trying to get them in through the back door; it is as 
though he wants to acknowledge the common intuition that we have 
duties to them, but has been trapped by his belief (which I do not 
dispute) that moral agency is the source of all moral value.  His 
mistake, I believe, is in not recognizing that we can locate moral value
in things other than ourselves: its source need not be the same as its 
location. 
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